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INTRODUCTION
Every fall, millions of school-age children engage in a scary, but
necessary, ritual. They bring home vaccination forms that their
teachers gave to them, with instructions that the papers can only be
signed once their pediatricians have pricked the children with various
needles and administered different inoculations. After a further
glance at the forms, the parents learn that their children may not at-
tend school without these vaccinations.! In several states, however,
certain families can opt out of the vaccination requirement while
their children remain registered for school.2 These families must
qualify for a statutory, religious or philosophical exemption from vac-
cination.
Such exemptions are shrouded in controversy, leading three states
to declare them improper.' The Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the exemptions; however, there are
now stronger reasons to assess and rethink the exemptions to state-
compelled vaccinations. As the number of alternative and "spiritual"
treatments increase, and as access to incorrect information about the
dangers of standard vaccinations increases through additional ave-
J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2002, Johns Hopkins
University. Many thanks to Professors Kristin Madison and Jennifer Rosato for their assistance;
to Marc Melzer, Dionne Anthon, Lexer Quamie, Erica Flores, Akua Asare, and the entire edito-
rial staff of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their input and hard work; and to my family,
friends, and Arash for their support throughout this endeavor.
All states now require proof of vaccination as a condition of school enrollment against
numerous diseases, most often diphtheria, measles, rubella, and polio. SeeJames G. Hodge, Jr.
& Lawrence 0. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90
KY. LJ. 831 (2001-02) (providing an overview of the history of vaccination as it relates to school
enrollment).
2 Forty-seven states allow for religious exemptions, while seventeen states allow for philoso-
phical exemptions from compelled vaccination. See discussion infra Parts I.B (The Religious
Exemption), Part I.C (The Philosophical Exemption).
3 The three states are Mississippi, West Virginia, and Arkansas. See Ross D. Silverman, No
More Kidding Around: Restructuring Non-Medical Childhood Immunization Exemptions to Ensure Public
Health Protection, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 277, 283 (2003) ("Three states (Arkansas, Mississippi,
and West Virginia) offer no religious exemption from school immunization requirements.").
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nues of information, such as the Internet,4 the number of people who
seek an inoculation exemption for their children for non-medical
reasons will continue to increase.5 Additionally, when large epidem-
ics pass, vaccination rates generally decline, increasing the danger of
.7 *
outbreaks. While outbreaks among communities that deny such vac-
cinations to their children are infrequent, such outbreaks have been
devastating and remain a threat."
This Comment provides a broad overview of the constitutional,
public health, and implementation challenges of the religious and
philosophical exemptions to state-compelled vaccination. I ulti-
mately conclude that the exemptions are problematic for numerous
reasons, among them constitutional concerns, and should be either
eliminated or significantly revised. This Comment focuses on the re-
ligious exemption, as it is the more widespread and controversial of
4 See, e.g., Concerned Parents for Vaccine Safety, Whats [sic] in a Shot? (listing antifreeze,
disinfectant, and aluminum as regular components of vaccines and suggesting that vaccines can
cause Alzheimer's Disease and seizures, when no direct link has yet been found between vacci-
nations and these results), at http://web.archive.org/web/20040213184301/home.sprynet
.com/-gyrene/whatsi-l.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); Vaccination Liberation, Vaccination
Liberation Information (stating incorrectly that "[v]accines often prove INEFFECTIVE in prevent-
ing disease"), at http://www.vaclib.org/basic/investigate.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005); Vac-
cine Information (providing articles and editorials about the alleged dangers of vaccination), at
http://www.vaccinetruth.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2005). But see Nicola Jones, Link Between
Vaccine and Autism "Entirely Flawed": Medical Journal Says It Regrets Publishing Wakefield's Research
on MMR, NATURE, Feb. 23, 2004 (reporting that a popular study suggesting a link between the
measles, mumps, rubella ("MMR") vaccine and autism was flawed and that the journal that pub-
lished the study regretted having made that assertion), available at http://www.nature.com/
nsu/040223/040223-1.html.
5 In Colorado, the state with the lowest vaccination coverage, exemption rates have jumped
tenfold over the past eleven years. In Oregon, the number of exemptions has doubled since
1999, largely due to an increase in religious exemptions. In Washington, exemptions have in-
creased from 3.4% of kindergarten-aged children five years ago to 4.1%, or an increase of 2400
children. See Steve Mitchell, Parents Opting Out of Vaccines for Kids, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 13,
2003 ("The rates of parents that are taking non-medical exemptions to school immunization
laws are increasing in many states and are probably increasing nationally."), available at http://
www.upi.com/view.cfrn?StorylD=20031 1 13-041813-2746r.
6 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 848-49 ("The effectiveness of the vaccine itself led to
a progressive, albeit apathetic, argument: since the vaccine has worked, why should individuals
continue to be subjected to the harms of vaccination unless there exists an actual threat of dis-
ease in the community?").
7 See Mitchell, supra note 5 ("This [increase in non-medical exemptions to school immuni-
zation laws] poses a greater risk of disease outbreaks and even poses risks to vaccinated chil-
dren."); see also State, Church Clash Over Faith Healing Beliefs, BELOIT DAILY NEWS, Apr. 21, 1997
[hereinafter Faith Healing Beliefs] (discussing members of the Faith Tabernacle who were tried
for involuntary manslaughter for allowing their children's illnesses to progress without any
medical care), available at http://www.beloitdallynews.com/articles/1997/04/21/export
84624.txt.
8 See Faith Healing Beliefs, supra note 7 (describing the Faith Tabernacle, a controversial reli-
gious sect in suburban Pennsylvania that was given exemption from childhood vaccination, and
the 1991 deaths of five children from a measles outbreak).
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the two. Additionally, the religious exemption raises more concerns,
making reconsideration necessary.
In Part I of this Comment, I examine the history of both state-
compelled vaccination and the religious and philosophical statutory
exemptions adopted by several states. In Part II, I present several
constitutional arguments for limiting exemptions and argue that reli-
gious exemption statutes might violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment9 because several types of religious exemption
statutes violate one or more of the three prongs established by the
Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman ° as the test to determine the
constitutionality of laws challenged under the Establishment Clause."
I also argue that the religious exemption statutes violate the Equal
Protection Clause because they discriminate against people who have
unrecognized or non-established religious beliefs against vaccination,
and because the statutes also violate the equal protection rights of
those individuals who have received vaccinations yet remain vulner-
able to the diseases. In Part III, I discuss additional, non-
constitutional arguments for limiting both the religious and philoso-
phical exemptions. I first discuss the importance of preserving the
rights of unvaccinated children, who cannot decide for themselves if
they wish to avoid the illnesses that the vaccinations are intended to
protect against. I suggest that the exemptions may be improper be-
cause they force children to become martyrs, and because they violate
a child's right to an "open future," as defined by Joel Feinberg.1 Ad-
ditionally, I argue that the state's compelling interest in preserving
public health and safety justifies compulsory vaccination, without the
option of exemption, as a prerequisite for school enrollment. I ad-
dress in greater detail the cluster problem caused by groups of ex-
emptors living in the same community and how this might under-
mine herd immunity. "4  I also discuss the need to reconsider the
current religious exemption system because of the difficulty associ-
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion"); see infra Part II.A.1 (First Amendment Concerns: The Establishment
Clause).
10 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
11 See infra Part II.A.1 (First Amendment Concerns: The Establishment Clause) (listing the
prongs of the Lemon test and explaining how the current religious exemption statutes each vio-
late different prongs of the test).
12 See infra Part III.A. 1 (Martyrdom and a Court's Consideration of a.Child's Individual Views
and Rights).
13 See infra Part III.A.2 (A Child's Right to an "Open Future"); see also Joel Feinberg, The
Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY,
AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980) (describing the concept
of an "open future").
14 See infra Part III.B.1 (The Threat to Public Health).
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ated with defining exemption criteria and applying a proper test for
who might qualify for an exemption.' 5
Finally, in Part IV I conclude that the current exemption system is
in need of reformation and reconsideration, and I propose several
possible solutions. Such solutions include, but are not limited to,
creating a system of mandatory vaccination with no exemptions, and
pursuing several fundamental changes and ideal statutes that might
be adopted to help resolve the problems associated with exemption
statutes. I also put forth a number of more practical solutions, in-
cluding public health and informational campaigns about the bene-
fits of vaccination with the goals of promoting vaccination and dispel-
ling common myths surrounding vaccination.
I. COMPELLED VACCINATION AND EXEMPTION BACKGROUND
Before assessing the constitutionality of the religious and philoso-
phical exemptions, I will first consider the history and development
of both state-compelled vaccinations and the subsequent develop-
ment of these exemptions.
A. State-Compelled Vaccinations
The debate surrounding the regulation of vaccination started
when local governments in colonial America began controlling physi-
cian inoculation, 7 shortly after Dr. Edward Jenner created the small-
pox vaccine in 1796.18 The first laws requiring immunization ap-
peared in the United States in the early nineteenth century.' By
201905, only six states did not have a smallpox vaccination statute
:5 See infra Part III.B.2 (The Impracticality of Regulation and Proper Enforcement).
16 See infra Part IV (Possible Solutions).
7 See GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 162-65 (1958) (detailing the work by
Johann Peter Frank in promoting areas such as child health, marriage, public hygiene, food,
andpublic health).
Dr. Jenner is considered the first scientist of immunology for his success in transforming
smallpox from "an uncontrollable epidemic into a manageable, avoidable disease." Hodge &
Gostin, supra note 1, at 840; see also DERRICK BAxBY, JENNER'S SMALLPOX VACCINE: THE RIDDLE
OF VACCINIA VIRUS & ITS ORIGINS (1981) (analyzing the origins of Jenner's smallpox vaccine);
EDWARD JENNER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF VARIOLAW VACCINAE, A DISEASE,
DISCOVERED IN THE WESTERN COUNTIES OF ENGLAND, PARTICULARLY GLOUCESTERSHIRE AND
KNOWN BY THE NAME OF COW POX (Classics of Medicine Library 1978) (1798) (describing Jen-
ner's success and detailing specific findings made during his 1796 smallpox experiment). Jen-
ner has been called the "Father of Vaccination." Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 838. He also
helped place vaccination at the forefront of public health. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Pre-
vention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for
Children-United States, 1900-1998, 281 JAMA 1482, 1482-83 (1999) (listing vaccination as one
of the top ten public health achievements of the twentieth century).
19 FRANK P. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW MANUAL 72-73 (2d ed. 1997); see also WILLIAM P.
PRENTICE, POLICE POWERS ARISING UNDER THE LAW OF OVERRULING NECESSITY 132 (1894)
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In that year, for the first time, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of state-compelled vaccination and established the right of a
state to compel an individual to receive a vaccination. In Jacobson v.
Massachusetts," the Court ruled that "the police power of a state must
be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and
the public safety."2 2  In 1922, the Court further upheld a local gov-
ernment mandate that required vaccination as a prerequisite for en-
rolling in school in Zucht v. King.22 These two cases, combined with
the "commitment of lawmakers to the principle of compulsory vacci-
nation as a prerequisite to school enrollment"2 4 allowed for one of the
"most momentous achievements" of public health during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries: a dramatic reduction in morbidity
and mortality due to vaccine preventable illnesses.25 The average life-
span of individuals living in the United States has increased more
("Compulsory vaccination has been instituted... by the laws of several States, in respect to mi-
nors. City ordinances regulate it, but the indirect methods of excluding children not vacci-
nated from schools and factories, or, in cases of immigrants, insisting upon quarantine, and the
offer of free vaccination ... are more effective."), quoted in Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 849
n.126; Charles L. Jackson, State Laws on Compulsory Immunization in the United States, 84 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 787 (1969) (stating that Massachusetts enacted the first mandatory vaccination law
in 1809).
20 William Fowler, Principal Provisions of Smallpox Vaccination Laws and Regulations in the United
States, 56 PUB. HEALTH REP. 167 (1941) (enumerating statistics on smallpox vaccination in the
United States). But see William Fowler, State Diphtheria Immunization Requirements, 57 PUB
HEALTH REP. 325 (1942) (noting that compulsory immunization laws for diseases other than
smallpox were not enacted until the late 1930's). See generally Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at
849-50 ("By... 1905, many states had already required citizens to submit to smallpox vaccina-
tion, among other diseases.").
21 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
22 Id. at 25. The defendant challenged a Massachusetts compulsory smallpox vaccination
statute on the grounds that "his liberty [was] invaded when the state subject[ed] him to fine or
imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to submit to vaccination." Id. at 26. He further con-
tended that
a compulsory vaccination law [was] unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and, there-
fore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health
in such way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against one who
objects to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon his
person.
Id.
23 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922); see also People ex rel. Hill v. Bd. of Educ., 195 N.W. 95, 100
(Mich. 1923) (showing that state supreme courts also regularly upheld school vaccination re-
quirements for enrollment).
24 Silverman, supra note 3, at 277; see also Kathryn M. Edwards, State Mandates and Childhood
Immunizations, 284 JAMA 3171, 3172 (2000) (noting that immunization laws help alleviate
health risks); Walter A. Orenstein & Alan R. Hinman, The Immunization System in the United
States-The Role of School Immunization Laws, 17 VACCINE S19, S19 (1999) (stating that immuniza-
tion laws have played a key role in reducing preventable diseases).
25 Silverman, supra note 3, at 281-82.
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than thirty years since 1900,26 and twenty-five years of this gain are at-
tributable to advances in public health, most prominently, vaccina-
tion. A public health report published in 1857, conducted by Dr.
John Simon, and commissioned by the Queen of England, concluded
that, "in the several decades following the adoption of vaccination
policies in many European countries, mortality rates due to smallpox
declined over eighty-eight percent.
28
A small but vocal antivaccinationist minority developed as the first
states began to require vaccination, and expanded when cities began
to require all children wishing to enroll in public schools to provide
evidence of vaccination. 29 Antivaccinationists pointed to smallpox
outbreaks in Europe at public elementary schools that required vac-
cination 3° as evidence that school vaccination policies were ineffective
and failed to prevent outbreaks. Antivaccinationists portrayed vac-
cines as "foreign substances, or poisons, capable of causing more
harm than good."3' Many antivaccinationists also painted vaccines as
a "surgical operation as opposed to routine care. 3 Further, public
health authorities "were characterized as abusive, untrustworthy, and
paternalistic, ''s4 and resisting the efforts of public health officials "was
26 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Ten
Great Public Health Achievements-United States, 1900-1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 241 (1999) [hereinafter Ten Great Public Health Achievements], available at http://
www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00056796.htm. For additional information on
the benefits of vaccination in the United States with regards. to reducing illness and death
among children, see Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., Achievements in Public Health, 1900-99 Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Chil-
dren U.S., 1990-1998 18 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243 (1999) (listing vaccination as
the first of ten great health achievements).
27 Ten Great Public Health Achievements, supra note 26, at 241.
28 Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 842.
29 Id. at 844 ("Although vaccination was generally accepted by the population of colonial
America, minority opposition arose in many quarters.").
30 See id. at 847. The authors note:
Historic accounts of a short-lived smallpox outbreak in Gloucester, England in 1890 are
illustrative [of the debate between public health officials and antivaccinationists]. De-
spite a school vaccination policy in place at the time, the outbreak was traced to several
children who were infected while attending public elementary school. Almost 2000 peo-
ple were infected, including 706 children, and 484 persons died.
Id. (footnote omitted) (discussed in Editorial, Topics of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1897, at 5-
6). Id. at 848.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Cram v. Sch. Bd., 136 A. 263 (N.H. 1927) (describing the claim of a petitioner
who argued that his child should be exempt from state compelled vaccination because "vaccina-
tion consists of performing a surgical operation by injecting a poison, the ingredients of which
are not known, into the blood of [his] daughter and that will endanger her health and life, and
he will not permit it to be done").
Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 849; see also J.N. HAYS, THE BURDENS OF DISEASE 280
(1998) (mentioning that early opponents of vaccination viewed it as dangerous).
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equated with fighting government oppression. Other antivaccina-
tionists acknowledged the efficacy of vaccinations, yet also argued
that since the vaccines had already worked, why should individuals
"continue to be subjected to the harms of vaccination unless there ex-
ists an actual threat of disease in the community? 3 6 Finally, many of
those against vaccines argued that the treatment violated their sacred
religious beliefs.3 7 Most of the above arguments, whether rational or
irrational in light of current scientific knowledge, are used by pre-
sent-day antivaccinationists and those in favor of exemptions.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the Constitu-
tion permits states to offer religious-based exemptions; however,
many individuals believe that the exemption statutes, specifically the
religious exemption, will be deemed unconstitutional because of the
Establishment Clause and equal protection arguments discussed be-
low.
3 8
B. The Religious Exemption
Currently, forty-seven states offer some form of religious exemp-
tion from school immunization laws. 9 There are two different ways
these states generally classify qualified exemptors.40  A minority of
states limit their religious exemption to those who belong to "organ-
ized," "recognized," or "established" religions.4' Some states evaluate
3 Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 849.
36 Id.
37 See Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious Exemptions to Childhood Immunization Statutes: Reaching
for a More Optimal Balance Between Religious Freedom and Public Health, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109,
112-13 (1997) (supporting the argument that the state must advance public health through
voluntary means before it can force citizens to subordinate their religious beliefs).
38 See infra Part II.A.1 (First Amendment Concerns: The Establishment Clause); see also
Silverman, supra note 3, at 281 ("[T]he Court's extensive history of First Amendment accom-
modations in other contexts, coupled with numerous state and lower federal court decisions,
directly addressing constitutional issues of religious exemption provisions in state vaccination
laws, suggest childhood immunization laws [compelling vaccination as a prerequisite for school
enrollment] are not per se unconstitutional.").
39 Mississippi, West Virginia, and Arkansas are the exceptions. See Silverman, supra note 3, at
282 n.31.
40 Id. at 282.
41 Id.; see, e.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 97.62(2) (West 2001) ("A signed affidavit must be pre-
sented by the child's parent or guardian stating that the immunization conflicts with the tenets
and practices of a recognized religious organization of which the applicant is an adherent or
member.").
As a result of the Conscientious Objector cases arising out of the Vietnam War, however,
many states have removed this language from their statutes. Silverman, supra note 3, at 282; see
also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (defining "religious belief" to mean a be-
lief that "occup[ies] the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God
holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption"); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding "any belief that is 'arguably religious'
is considered 'religious' for the sake of free exercise analysis").
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an individual applying for religious exemption to determine if his be-
liefs are "genuinely and sincerely held, 4 while other states simply re-
quire applicants to submit a form stating that they oppose vaccination
on religious grounds.43
Mississippi, West Virginia, and Arkansas do not allow a religious
exemption from the school vaccination requirement.44 In 1979, the
Mississippi Supreme Court declared its religious exemption statute
unconstitutional,45  citing many of the arguments made generally
against both religious and philosophical exemptions. The court
ruled that the exemption violated the equal protection rights of those
children who did not qualify for exemption, and said that a religious
exemption provision "would require the great body of school chil-
dren to be vaccinated and at the same time expose them to the haz-
ard of associating in school with children exempted under the reli-
gious exemption who had not been immunized as required by the
statute.47 The court also ruled in the interest of public health and
said that the state had an "overriding and compelling public inter-
est "48 to protect children from harm, "even when such rights con-
flicted with the religious rights of the parents seeking exemptions for
their children." 49 The court's ruling directly follows the arguments of
several scholars and groups against the religious exemption system, as
I discuss below in Part II.
C. The Philosophical Exemption
At least seventeen states allow philosophical exemptions, ° which
carry an even lower burden of proof than the religious exemptions to
42 Berg v. Glen Cove City Sch. Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651, 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
43 SeeJennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for Obtaining Nonmedical Exemptions to State Immunization
Laws, 91 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 645 (2001) (describing qualifying procedures for exemptions).
44 Silverman, supra note 3, at 282 n.31.
45 Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 224 (Miss. 1979).
46 Id. at 222-23.
47 Id. at 223.
48 Id. at 222.
49 Silverman, supra note 3, at 283; see also Brown, 378 So. 2d at 221 ("Is it mandated by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution that innocent children, too young to decide
for themselves, are to be denied the protection against crippling and death that immunization
provides because of a religious belief adhered to by a parent or parents?").
50 See Daniel A. Salmon & Andrew W. Siegel, Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Vacci-
nation Requirements and Lessons Learned from Conscientious Objectors from Conscription, 116 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 289, 290 (2001) (describing the system of vaccination laws and noting the avail-
able exemptions); Ross D. Silverman & Thomas May, Private Choice Versus Public Health: Religion,
Morality, and Childhood Vaccination Law, 1 MARGINS 505, 516-17 (2001) (discussing Colorado's
exemption and the ease with which many states allow exemption from vaccination).
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gain a waiver from school vaccination requirements." These exemp-
tions vary depending on the state, and they allow the parent or stu-
dent to "assert in writing that he/she has another reason to object to
vaccines. "0 2 In many of these states, individuals must object to all vac-
cines and not just a particular vaccine in order to use the philosophical
objection. s As in the case of religious exemption provisions, the
wording of each state's philosophical exemption provisions vary; they
may, for example, recognize objections based on "personal,"" "phi-• ,55 • • , 56 5
losophical, or moral convictions, or other. In 1990, twenty-
two states allowed a philosophical exemption to compelled vaccina-
51 See Salmon & Siegel, supra note 50, at 290 (describing statutory exemption schemes). Ad-
ditionally, Minnesota, a state with no religious exemption, has a broad philosophical exemption
statute; a child can be held exempt from compulsory vaccination requirements if the parent or
guardian provides a notarized signed statement to an administrator stating that the individual
was not vaccinated because of "conscientiously held beliefs." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.15(3) (d)
(West 2003). The statute serves as an example of how philosophical exemption statutes are
typically worded:
If a notarized statement signed by the minor child's parent or guardian or by the eman-
cipated person is submitted to the administrator or other person having general control
and supervision of the school or child care facility stating that the person has not been
immunized as prescribed in subdivision 1 because of the conscientiously held beliefs of
the parent or guardian of the minor child or of the emancipated person, the immuniza-
tions specified in the statement shall not be required. This statement must also be for-
warded to the commissioner of the department of health.
Id.
I Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Pol-
icy, 5J. PHARMACY& L. 249, 260-61 (1995).
53 See National Vaccine Information Center, State Exemptions (describing generally the phi-
losophical exemption), at http://www.909shot.com/Issues/state%20exemptions.htn (last vis-
ited Mar. 19, 2005).
54 Colorado is one state with such wording. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-4-1704(2), 25-4-
1704(4) (b) (Supp. 1996) ("An infant shall be exempted from receiving the required immuniza-
tions... [u]pon submitting a statement signed by one parent or guardian that such parent or
guardian adheres to a religious belief whose teachings are opposed to immunizations, or... has
a personal belief that is opposed to immunization." (emphasis added)).
55 Maine uses this term in its exemption statute. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6355(3)
(West 1999) (stating that a child may not be enrolled without an immunization certificate ex-
cept when "[t]he parent states in writing a sincere religious belief which is contrary to the im-
munization requirement of this subchapter or an opposition to the immunization for moral,
philosophical or other personal reasons" (emphasis added)).
56 Vermont is an example of a state with this phrasing in its philosophical exemption statute.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1122(a)(3) (2000) ("A person may remain in school without a re-
quired immunization: ... If the person, or... the person's parent or guardian states in writing
that the person, parent or guardian has religious beliefs or moral convictions opposed to immu-
nization." (emphasis added)).
57 Michigan uses this wording in its philosophical exemption statute. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.9215 (1999) ("A child is exempt from this part if a parent, [etc.] ... presents a written
statement to the administrator of the child's school or operator of the group program to the
effect that the requirements of this part cannot be met because of religious convictions or other
objection to immunization." (emphasis added)); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(9215) (Michie
1999) (same); see also Severyn, supra note 52, at 261 (cataloguing states with philosophical ex-
emptions).
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tion. 8 However, several state legislatures have since deleted the phi-
losophical exemption provisions from their state codes following en-
couragement by the state departments of health.59
In states that have philosophical exemptions, parents claim the
exemption with increasing regularity.60 Additionally, in states that of-
fer both exemptions, the number of philosophical exemptions is far
greater than the number of religious and medical exemptions.61
Much of this Comment addresses the religious exemption, as the phi-
losophical exemption exists only in a minority of states. Additionally,
the philosophical exemption does not present the Establishment
Clause threat that the religious exemption presents because philoso-
phical exemption statutes do not specifically address religious beliefs
in the way that religious exemption statutes do. Finally, the philoso-
phical exemption statutes are prone to less abuse (because the phi-
losophical statutes have little or no threshold and are therefore
nearly incapable of abuse) than the religious exemption statutes.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR LIMITING EACH EXEMPTION
A. The Religious Exemption
1. First Amendment Concerns: The Establishment Clause
The religion clauses of the First Amendment state that "Congress
shall make no law [1] respecting an establishment of religion or
[2] prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' '62 The first clause is often
called the Establishment Clause, while the second is referred to as the
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Pub. Health. Serv., Ctrs. for Disease Control and
Prevention, State Immunization Requirements 1991-1992. Additionally, Delaware and Mon-
tana deleted their philosophical exemption provisions "just prior to publication of noted sur-
vey." Severyn, supra note 52, at 261 n.84.
See Severyn, supra note 52, at 261 ("For example, Missouri, Indiana, and Nebraska lost
their philosophical exemptions in 1992, 1993, and 1994, respectively.").
See, e.g., Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and Pertussis Asso-
dated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 JAMA 3145, 3147 (2000) (describing an
eighty-three percent increase in philosophical exemptions in a single year in Colorado).
Id. (stating that philosophical exemptions comprised eighty-seven percent of total exemp-
tions granted in Colorado in 1998); see also Donald G. McNeil Jr., When Parents Say No to Child
Vaccinations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at Al (describing the health ramifications of philoso-
phical exemption statutes); Silverman, supra note 3, at 284-85 (noting the rise in popularity of
exemption statutes).
62 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (hold-
ing that the Fourteenth Amendment "embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment"); see, e.g., Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Estab-
lishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 306 (1984) (noting that the Establishment Clause
creates grounds for challenging regulations of public morality).
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Free Exercise Clause." While both sides of the exemption debate
have used both clauses, those who argue that religious exemptions
are unconstitutional tend to use the Establishment Clause to bolster
their point, contending that the religious exemption statutes im-
properly advance religion.Y Those in favor of the religious exemp-
tion argue that eliminating the exemption and requiring children of
these individuals to submit to vaccinations before attending school
violates the Free Exercise Clause.
At the very minimum, the Establishment Clause ensures that
"[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or pre-
fer one religion over another."66 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 67the Supreme
Court established a three-pronged test that the Court has consistently
used to determine the constitutionality of laws challenged under the
Establishment Clause68 In order for a statute to be deemed constitu-
tional under the test, it must satisfy the following three requirements:
(1) the legislature must have had a secular purpose for adopting the
enactment in question; (2) the primary effect of the law to be scruti-
nized must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of gov-
ernment with religion.69
Two out of the three tests that states use to determine an appli-
cant's eligibility for religious exemption fail under one or more of
the prongs of the Lemon test. Those states that require an applicant
to belong to an "organized," "recognized," or "established" religion
employ an exemption test that likely violates both the second and
third prongs because such statutes can be construed to "advance" cer-
tain recognized religions while "inhibiting" the practice of other,
non-recognized faiths. Additionally, such statutes result in "excessive"
government entanglement with religion.76
68 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 967-68 (1997);
see also Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 858-59 (describing traditional interpretations of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the context of state-compelled vaccinations).
64 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 860 ("To the extent the Establishment Clause forbids
governments from passing laws which favor religious preferences, it seems arguable that states
may not exempt religious objectors from school vaccination requirements.").
65 See Caroline L. Kraus, Note, Religious Exemptions-Applicability to Vegetarian Beliefs, 30
HOFSTRA L. REV. 197, 199 (2001) ("Religious advocates argue that if mandatory vaccinations are
contrary to the teachings of a religious belief, forcing them to submit to vaccination violates the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.").
66 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
67 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68 See generally Kraus, supra note 65, at 205 (providing further background on Lemon v.
Kurtzman).
69 See Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81, 89 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (discussing the Lemon test).
70 Id.
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In Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School District, the
court ruled that the requirement that parents be "bona fide members
of a recognized religious organization' 1 to be exempt on religious
grounds from a school vaccination requirement violates both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 2 The Sherr court applied
the Lemon test and held that the requirement under section 2164 of
the Public Health Law failed both the second and third prongs.73
The court held that the language of the statute, which limited the
eligible class of those who qualified for exemption, "inhibited the re-
ligious practices of those individuals who were opposed to vaccina-
tions on religious grounds but did not belong to groups that the state
recognized as bona fide religious organizations," 74 and therefore vio-
lated the second prong.75 The court said that those individuals who
were members of "bona fide" religious organizations were permitted
to live according to the tenets of their religious beliefs,76 while those
individuals not belonging to recognized religious groups were forced
to "either act contrary to their religious beliefs or deny their children
an education." 7  Religious exemption statutes that require an appli-
cant to belong to an "organized" religion therefore violate the second
prong because they advance the practice of the "organized" religions
included in the statutes, while inhibiting the practice of religions ex-
cluded by the statutes. The court also found that the statute resulted
in the excessive entanglement of the government in religious affairs
because it "gave official recognition to certain religions and not oth-
ers, thereby involving the government in religious matters to a degree
not permitted by the Constitution."'
If the Supreme Court is confronted with one of the many state
statutes similar to the one addressed in Sherr, it should follow the Sherr
71 Id. at 98.
72 See id. ("Defendants' restriction of the exception in such a manner violates both religion
clauses of the First Amendment.").
73 Id. at 89 ("The clause ... at issue in this litigation runs afoul of at least two of the three
elements of the Lemon test.").
74 Kraus, supra note 65, at 205; see also Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 89 (holding that the clause at
issue was invalid).
75 See Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 89 (noting that states may neither advance nor inhibit religion).
76 Id. at 90. According to the court,
[The statute] makes available to members of certain religious organizations to which the
state has given some sort of official recognition a statutory benefit for which other indi-
viduals who may belong to either an unrecognized religious group or possess their own
personal religious beliefs are not eligible. The establishment clause surely cannot mean
much if a preferential restriction such as that contained in [this statute] can pass consti-
tutional muster.
Id.
I Kraus, supra note 65, at 205; see also Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 89 (holding that such a scheme
"blatantly" violates the Constitution).
78 Kraus, supra note 65, at 205; see also Sher, 672 F. Supp. at 89 (holding that the government
must not excessively involve itself with religion).
1112 [Vol. 7:4
STATE-COMPELLED VACCINATION
line of arguing and rule that such an exemption statute violates the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test. In addition to the Sherr
court's argument that the second prong inhibits the religious prac-
tices of those seeking exemption who do not belong to a "bona fide"
religious organization, such statutes also improperly advance certain
religious groups. Several state courts have ruled that granting privi-
leges to "recognized churches" violates the Establishment Clause
79
because "certain religious denominations cannot be granted privi-
leges not afforded to other denominations or religions."0 These
courts have ruled that permitting individuals that belong to religious
groups that forbid vaccination to opt out of the vaccination require-
ment while requiring all other individuals belonging to religious
groups that allow vaccination to be vaccinated before attending
school is an example of the state providing privileges to particular re-
ligious groups."' The exemption statutes that require individuals to
belong to certain "recognized" religions to qualify for exemption
therefore violate the second prong of the Lemon test, as such statutes
both improperly inhibit and advance the practice of religion for cer-
tain groups.
The Court should also rule that such exemption statutes violate
the third Lemon prong because the "restriction of [an] exception to
'recognized religious organizations' clearly requires that the govern-
Several courts have ruled differently, saying that a requirement that parents be members
of a "nationally recognized and established church or religious denomination" to qualify for a
religious exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Kleid v. Bd. of Educ.,
406 F. Supp. 902, 904-06 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
80 Mass. Citizens for Children, Jeopardizing Children's Lives (1994) [hereinafter Jeopardizing
Children's Lives], at http://www.masskids.org/jcl/jcl-l.html. Courts have similarly held. For
example, the Supreme Court of Maryland concluded:
However broadly the phrase "recognized church or religious denomination" could
reasonably be construed, the statutory language certainly fails to encompass personal re-
ligious beliefs like [the petitioner's] which are not associated with any church or de-
nomination....
Consequently, ... "[m]embership in a recognized religious group cannot be re-
quired as a condition of exemption from vaccination." We hold that [the statute] con-
travenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Davis v. State, 451 A.2d 107, 113-14 (Md. 1982) (citations omitted); see also Dalli v. Bd. of Educ.,
267 N.E.2d 219, 223 (Mass. 1971) (stating that those belonging to a "recognized church or reli-
gious denomination .... enjoy the benefit of an exemption which is denied to other persons
whose objections to vaccination are also grounded in religious belief," and that "[t]his pre-
ferred treatment of one group and discrimination against the other violates the First and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution"); Maier v. Besser, 341 N.Y.S.2d 411, 414
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) ("[I]f the Legislature desires to exempt for religious grounds a certain class
of persons, it must do so on a logical and non-discriminatory basis.").
81 See Jeopardizing Children's Lives, supra note 80 ("In addition, a number of state courts have
indicated that granting privileges to 'recognized churches' probably violates the 1st Amend-
ment's prohibition of an establishment of religion, that is, certain religious denominations can-
not be granted privileges not afforded to other denominations or religions.").
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ment involve itself in religious matters to an inordinate degree." 2
When a state conditions a statutorily created exemption on member-
ship in a religious denomination, the state has "bestowed a blessing of
governmental approval.""3 This serves as "some sort of official recog-
nition [of] a statutory benefit for which other individuals who may
belong to either an unrecognized religious group or possess their
own personal religious beliefs are not eligible.""M Such involvement
qualifies as excessive government entanglement in religious affairs to
a degree not permitted by the Constitution,"" and therefore violates
the third prong of the Lemon test. This involvement should thus be
deemed to violate the Establishment Clause.
Additionally, the Court should rule that a second type of exemp-
tion statute, involving an assessment of an individual's religious be-
liefs and whether these beliefs are genuinely and sincerely held, 6 also
violates the third prong of the Lemon test and therefore violates the
Establishment Clause. Under the sincerity test, the party desiring ex-
emption must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that his or
her asserted beliefs are "sincerely" held . Evidence a court might use
in a sincerity analysis includes (1) whether the adherent acted incon-
sistently with the belief at issue; (2) whether the adherent materially
gained by masking secular beliefs with a religious veneer; and (3) the
religion's history and size. Courts must further exercise "extreme
caution"n when conducting a sincerity analysis because the inquiry
"in essence puts the individual on trial for heresy."° The court there-
fore becomes excessively involved and "entangled" in an analysis of
an individual's religious beliefs when it engages in a sincerity analy-
sis.(1 This excessive entanglement therefore does not satisfy the third
prong of the Lemon test, and therefore this form of exemption statute
violates the Establishment Clause.
The most simple school exemption test of the three tests that cur-
rently exist, the form submission, is the least likely to fail under the
82 Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 90.
9' Id.
84 Id.
See id. ("The establishment clause surely cannot mean much if a preferential restriction
such as that contained in [such statutes] can pass constitutional muster.").
8 See, e.g., 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 97.62(2) (West 2001) (allowing for religious exemptions).
87 See, e.g., Lewis v. Sobol, 710 F. Supp. 506, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (inquiring into the sin-
cerity of plaintiff's beliefs); Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 94 (same); In re Christine M., 595 N.Y.S.2d 606,
614 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (same).
88 See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 441 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that the International Society for Krishna Consciousness is a religion because it passes
a sincerity test).
89 Kraus, supra note 65, at 215.
90 Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 94.
91 See id. at 89 (discussing the Lemon test).
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three prongs of the Lemon test because it is the least invasive and re-
quires no further evaluation beyond the applicant's own word; there
is therefore no court involvement or evaluation of the specific relig-
ion or the individual's sincere beliefs. This single type of exemption
might survive a challenge under the Establishment Clause; however,
this exemption has many other problems, most notably its abuse by
many who simply wish to avoid vaccination.
2. Equal Protection
Many groups and individuals argue that, similar to the Establish-
ment Clause arguments discussed above, the exemption statutes vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause because they discriminate against
people who have unrecognized or unestablished religious beliefs
against vaccination. 9s The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the gov-
ernment from intentionally discriminating against individuals of sus-
pect classes; more specifically, classes based on race, religion, national
origin, or sex.94 The Supreme Court has defined a suspect class as a
group "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of po-
litical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process."95 A court could classify individuals
who belong to unrecognized religious groups as members of a "sus-
pect class" because they historically have been excluded by statutes
that provide privileges or protections for members of certain estab-
lished religious groups. In Dalli v. Board of Education,96 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that a state exemption for ob-
jectors who believed in "recognized church[es] or religious denomi-
nation[s]" 97 violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving preferen-
tial treatment to certain groups while ignoring others who have
sincere, though unrecognized, religious objections. s In Brown v.
92 See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (The Impracticality of Regulation and Proper Enforce-
ment).
See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (The Impracticality of Regulation and Proper Enforce-
ment); see alsoJames G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and
Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321,
1326 (1996) (demonstrating that "a compelling legal argument against religious exemptions to
child welfare and education laws is that they discriminate among groups of children.., on an
arbitrary and improper basis-namely, the religious beliefs of other persons").
94 See, e.g., Leah Hammett, Comment, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary Exclusion
from School, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1373, 1394-95 (1986) (assessing whether children with AIDS would
constitute a "suspect class").
95 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
96 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971).
97 Id. at 220.
98 See id. at 223 ("[This statute] extends preferred treatment to adherents and members 'of a
recognized church or religious denomination' who object to vaccination on religious
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Stone, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that religious exemption
policies violate the Equal Protection Clause because they "discrimi-
nate against the great majority of children whose parents have no
such religious convictions.
The exemption statutes also violate the equal protection rights of
those individuals who have received vaccinations yet remain vulner-
able to the diseases for which they been vaccinated. Vaccines are not
one hundred percent effective.'" Therefore, a percentage of chil-
dren who have been vaccinated will still be "susceptible to vaccine-
preventable diseases in the case of an outbreak."'0 ' This created an
environment in a Utah community with a "significant percentage"'0 '
of exempted individuals which made it possible for a "six (viral) gen-
eration-long outbreak" of measles where "more than half of those
who eventually contracted the disease had been vaccinated."' 3  Be-
cause a minority group of children have the right to "basic protec-
tions of life and health afforded to all other children, [a] policy [in
favor of exemption] is" therefore "an unconstitutional deprivation of
equal protection under the 14th Amendment.'
' 4
B. The Philosophical Exemption
Although the philosophical exemption is available in fewer states
than the religious exemption, individuals are increasingly taking ad-
vantage of these exemptions. In states offering both religious and
grounds.... This preferred treatment of one group and discrimination against the other vio-
lates the First and Fourteenth Amendments." (citations omitted)).
99 Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 223 (Miss. 1979).
100 See Tex. Med. Ass'n, Health and Science: Arguments Against Conscientious Objections for Exemp-
tionfrom Immunization (2003) ("Immunizations are only 90 percent to 95 percent effective so if
everyone is properly immunized 5 percent to 10 percent of the population still has a chance of
contracting the disease."), available at http://www.texmed.org/has/immunizationexempt.asp;
see also SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 512 (addressing the need to "recognize that the dangers im-
posed by refusal of vaccination are not wholly individual").
101 SILVERMAN, supra note 3, at 512.
102 Id. (citing Daniel A. Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical Exemp-
tions from Immunization Laws: Individual and Societal Risk of Measles, 282 JAMA 47, 47 (1999)).
103 See id. (citing Salmon et al., supra note 102, at 47).
104 Jeopardizing Children's Lives, supra note 80. The Supreme Court has rejected "equal protec-
tion arguments that school vaccination laws discriminate against school children to the exclu-
sion of others" through principles articulated in cases like Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572
(1913). Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 862. In Adams, the Court held that vaccination regu-
lations that treated cows held outside the city differently than those held inside the city did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 228 U.S. at 581-82. The Court said the regulations were
not discriminatory because they had "a proper relation to the purpose to be accomplished." Id.
Therefore, "lawmakers may choose to apply the law to selective groups, like children attending
school, without violating the equal protection clause provided that such application does not
discriminate against protected classes (i.e., a state law requiring vaccination for boys but not
girls)." Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 862.
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philosophical exemptions, the number of philosophical exemptions
far exceeds the number of religious exemptions. 5
The philosophical exemption is arguably weaker to uphold
against a constitutional challenge than the religious exemption, as it
does not have the strength of a Free Exercise Clause argument on its
side. Although the philosophical exemption is also rooted in the
First Amendment, the exemption is premised on an objector's right
to free speech, an argument that is even more likely to fail than a free
exercise argument when weighed against potential threats to public
health. Additionally, the philosophical exemption is prone to the
same criticisms as the religious exemption with regard to an unvacci-
nated child's right not to serve as a martyr, the child's right to an
open future, and the public health concerns, which I discuss below.
The philosophical exemption is also problematic because it is an
example of catering to the minority. Such an exemption can only
work when a small number of people elect to use it. As more indi-
viduals elect to use the exemption, the purpose of compelled vaccina-
tion is undermined. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,0 6 the Supreme Court
expressed concern for the control of minority interests in these in-
stances:
We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining
in any city or town where smallpox is prevalent... may thus defy the will
of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legis-
lative sanction of the State. If such be the privilege of a minority then a
like privilege would belong to each individual of the community, and the
spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire popu-
lation being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who
chooses to remain a part of that population. We are unwilling to hold it
to be an element in the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United
States that.., a minority of persons ... should have the power thus to
dominate the majority when supported in their action by the authority of
the State."7
Because the philosophical exemption is the weaker of the two ex-
emptions and is susceptible to much of the same criticism as the reli-
gious exemption, it is also in need of reconsideration. Furthermore,
if the religious exemption were to be deemed improper or unconsti-
tutional, this exemption would likely fall as well.
105 See Feikin et al., supra note 60, at 3147 ("Overall, philosophical exemptions accounted for
87% of all exemptions.").
106 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
107 Id. at 37-38.
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III. OTHER ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING THE EXEMPTIONS
A. Rights of Unvaccinated Children: Martyrdom and a
Child's Right to an "Open Future"
While the arguments discussed above address the constitutionality
of both the abstract concept of exemptions and the ways in which ex-
emptions are granted, there is little mention of the rights of unvacci-
nated children. In this Section, I present several arguments for limit-
ing exemptions based specifically on the preservation of the rights of
unvaccinated children.
1. Martyrdom and a Court's Consideration of a
Child's Individual Views and Rights
Many argue that exemption statutes should be eliminated or se-
verely restricted because they make martyrs of young unvaccinated
children who cannot decide for themselves if they wish to avoid the
illnesses targeted by the vaccinations that they do not receive. In
Prince v. Massachusetts,18 the Supreme Court considered whether a le-
gal guardian could allow her niece to sellJehovah's Witness literature
in public in violation of Massachusetts' child labor laws.' 9 The Court
ruled that: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But
it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and
legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.
'" ' 0
The Court further ruled in Wisconsin v. Yoder" that "the power of
the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject
to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child."' 2 A national seven-year
study of school-age children showed that children who were exempt
from vaccinations for religious or philosophical reasons were thirty-
five times more likely to contract measles than children who were
108 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
109 See Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the American
Healthcare System, 29 AM.J.L. & MED. 269, 283 (2003) (providing further background on Prince v.
Massachusetts).
110 Prince, 321 U.S. at 170.
1 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
112 Id. at 233-34. I should note that in Yoder, the Court ultimately ruled that Wisconsin's
compulsory school attendance law requiring public education beyond the eight grade unduly
burdened Amish and Mennonite families desiring to educate their children at home, and vio-
lated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 234 ("[Tlhe First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent the state from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend
formal high school to age 16.").
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vaccinated."' When parents decide against vaccinating their children
for either religious or philosophical reasons, they are making "mar-
tyrs" of their children, violating Prince's interpretation of the First
Amendment and its application to children. Therefore, an exemp-
tion statute that promotes such behavior also violates the interpreta-
tion contained in the Court's ruling.
Furthermore, in his partial dissent in Yoder,"' Justice William
Douglas argued that "no analysis of religious-liberty claims can take
place in a vacuum " 15 and that the Court should consider the views of
a mature child" 6 when assessing cases involving religious exemptions
as applied to compulsory education. Justice Douglas stated:
If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption [to compul-
sory school attendance], the inevitable effect is to impose the parents'
notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is mature
enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion
of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his
views.... As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this litigation
that his rights should be considered. And, if an Amish child desires to at-
tend high school, and is mature enough to have that desire respected,
the State may well be able to override the parents' religiously motivated
objections.
Although Yoder concerned a statute mandating compulsory school
education and not an exemption to compulsory vaccination, courts
should consider Justice Douglas's argument when assessing the valid-
ity of exemption statutes. Applying Justice Douglas's language, a
child has "no other effective forum" than litigation to have his or
her rights and views considered. If a court does not consider the
child's rights and views, these rights and views can be forever ignored
and disregarded. While there are undoubtedly many individuals who
would not object to this, such a practice seems to contradict the
Court's language in Prince and both the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in Yoder, where the Court strives to preserve and recognize the
rights of children.
Furthermore, although Justice Douglas specifically addressed the
rights of mature children, the "dilemma of conflicting rights between
parents and young children should also be recognized."" 9 Many of
11 See Salmon et al., supra note 102, at 47 (1999).
114 406 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
115 Id.
116 I should note that Justice Douglas does not specifically define the term "mature child,"
although he later suggests that mature child is one who is "mature enough to express poten-
tially conflicting desires." Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
19 See Merrick, supra note 109, at 285 (emphasis added) (describing specific problems en-
countered when parents' rights diverge from children's rights).
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the children affected by exemption statutes are not yet mature; they
are therefore especially vulnerable and "in need of the state's protec-
tion.' '2 0 Additionally, the views of an immature child are usually un-
known, and "[t] here is no guarantee or even a valid assumption that
[if] any of these children [live] to adulthood, they [will] have
adopted and adhered to the theological principles of their parents'
religions. 12 ' Therefore, Justice Douglas's arguments supporting the
rights and views of mature children should extend to immature chil-
dren.
Finally, even though Prince and Yoder did not specifically address
exemptions to state-compelled vaccination, any court addressing the
validity of a vaccination exemption statute should evoke the language
protecting children used in both cases, as such statutes also affect
children's rights (specifically, the rights of unvaccinated children).
Additionally, unlike Prince and Yoder, the exemption statutes threaten
the physical health of children, which would likely heighten the con-
sideration a court would provide for children's rights. Therefore, as
the Court has considered children's rights with regard to statutes in-
volving labor laws and compulsory school attendance, the Court (and
lower state courts) should consider the rights of unvaccinated chil-
dren when assessing the validity of exemption statutes for state-
compelled vaccination.
2. A Child's Right to an "Open Future"
States and the Court should also reconsider religious and phi-
losophical exemption statutes because they violate a child's right to
an "open future."22 Joel Feinberg describes a "child's right to an
open future," as a right "in-trust" which is to be "saved for the child
until he is an adult."' Dena Davis further expands on this idea:
These rights can be violated by adults in ways that cut off the possibil-
ity that the child, when he or she achieves adulthood, can exercise them.
An example is the right to choose one's spouse. Children and teenagers
lack the legal and social grounds on which to assert such a right, but
clearly the child, when he or she attains adulthood, will have that right.
Therefore, the child now has the right not to be irrevocably betrothed to
someone. Rights in this category include a long list: virtually all the im-
portant rights we believe adults have, but which must be protected now




l2 Feinberg, supra note 13, at 124 (describing the concept of an "open future").
123 Id. at 124-25.




Under this idea, the right to an "open future" forbids parents
from refusing vaccinations for their minor children, who have the
right to grow into their own futures where they will decide such issues
for themselves."' The exemption statutes, which allow parents to re-
fuse vaccinations, therefore violate Feinberg's idea of the right to an
"open future."
One might argue in response that a true "open future" would pre-
serve the child's ability to decide for himself at a later age whether to
receive a vaccination. However, delaying such an important decision
until the child is at an age where he can properly choose to be vacci-
nated increases his chances of exposure to a disease that he was not
vaccinated against. Additionally, such delay would hinder the child
from attending school in states without a philosophical exemption.
Therefore, allowing children to decide for themselves at a later age
whether to receive vaccinations is not consistent with Feinberg's
"open future," as this option might expose the child to more vaccine-
preventable illnesses, and deny the child a chance to enroll in public
school.
B. Public Health Concerns and the Impracticality
of Regulation and Proper Enforcement
In addition to the concerns discussed above relating to the rights
of unvaccinated children, there are additional concerns that further
justify eliminating or severely limiting exemptions. Below, I address
the threat to public health, and the impracticality of both creating
proper exemptions and regulating such exemptions to curb abuse.
1. The Threat to Public Health
A state's compelling interest in preserving public health and safety
justifies compulsory vaccination as a prerequisite for school enroll-
ment without exemption statutes. Many public health studies con-
clude that comprehensive vaccination policies are "greatly responsi-
ble for the significant reduction, and sometimes complete
eradication, of many childhood diseases,"" while others have said
that "childhood vaccinations are the most effective public-health
125 Davis noted the common counterargument to this idea:
Many people argue that when children are raised within such an isolationist and high-
demand religious culture as Jehovah's Witnesses, the idea that when they are 18 or 25 or
whenever they magically become able to make truly autonomous choices, that they are,
in Feinberg's words, "fully formed self-determining adult[s]," is not tenable.
Davis, supra note 124, at 94 (alteration in original) (quoting Feinberg, supra note 122, at 126).
126 Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 878.
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measure in American history.' '127  The threat of outbreaks justifies
compulsory vaccination with no exemption statute.
Although the occurrence of outbreaks within communities that
deny vaccinations to their children is not frequent because of the
benefits of herd immunity, 128 when outbreaks do occur they are
deadly and often affect the younger and more vulnerable school-age
children within the community first. 29 The measles outbreak in 1991
among the Faith Tabernacle, a controversial religious sect in subur-
ban Pennsylvania that was given exemption from childhood vaccina-
tion, is one such example: six children within the community died
from a measles outbreak, yet there were no adult deaths. 30  As dis-
cussed above, the implications of widespread exemptions also affect
vaccinated students as well as unvaccinated students.' The 1996
measles outbreak in Utah discussed above 132 demonstrated that as the
exempt population grows, the risk that vaccinated students may con-
tract measles from unvaccinated students significantly increases.
Additionally, the cluster problem further exacerbates threats to
public health and justifies eliminating or further restricting the ex-
emptions. A cluster problem occurs when those who apply for the
exemptions live in clusters in close proximity to one another. This is
127 Michael Specter, Comment, Shots in the Dark, NEwYORKER, Oct. 11, 1999, at 39.
128 Herd immunity is the protection bestowed upon a population against an infectious dis-
ease when a critical mass of that population is immune to the particular disease. See Thomas
May & Ross D. Silverman, "Clustering of Exemptions"As A Collective Action Threat to Herd Immunity,
21 VACCINE 1048 (2003) (examining the dangers that the "clusters of exemptions" pose to herd
immunity).
Herd immunity also involves the idea that universal protection does not necessarily require
universal vaccination. See Abi Berger, How Does Herd Immunity Work?, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 1466
(1999) (describing the rationale behind herd immunity in a large community). As one article
explains,
Most vaccines provide both individual and community protection. Most of the diseases
against which we vaccinate are transmitted from person to person. If a large enough
proportion of individuals in a community is immunized, this proportion serves as a pro-
tective barrier against transmission of the disease in the community, thus indirectly pro-
tecting those who are not immunized for whatever reason as well as those few who re-
ceived vaccine but are not protected (vaccine failures).
Alan R. Hinman et al., Concurrent Sessions: Tools to Prevent Infectious Disease: Childhood Immuniza-
tion: Laws that Work, 30J.L. MED. & ETHICS 122, 125 (Volume 30:3 Supp. 2002).
12 See Faith Healing Beliefs, supra note 7 (noting the clash between church and state over the
Faith Tabernacle exemptions).
130 See id. (describing a meeting of the Faith Tabernacle).
131 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 884 (describing outbreaks among vaccinated student
populations).
132 See Salmon et al., supra note 102, at 51 (suggesting that Utah's exempt population may
influence a measles outbreak). However, the Utah epidemic may also be associated with Utah's
failure to require two doses of the measles vaccine; the state was one of a minority of states at
the time which did not require two doses of measles vaccine as a prerequisite to school enroll-
ment. See id. (discussing other factors that contributed to Utah's measles epidemic); see also
Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 878 (discussing the correlation between a state's school im-
munization rules and the decline in vaccine preventable diseases).
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often the case with exemptors, as individuals cluster around a school
or church, or locations such as Vashon Island, Washington133 and
Boulder, Colorado.- 4 Both areas contain clusters of exemptors and
have seen outbreaks of illnesses preventable by vaccination. "Recent
studies have shown that clusters of exemptors, who are significantly
more susceptible to contracting vaccine preventable illnesses, pose an
increased risk of spread of disease not only to their unimmunized
peers, but also to the surrounding, largely vaccinated population."
35
The cluster effect also increases the risk of an unvaccinated child
contracting certain diseases. A study of measles outbreaks in Colo-
rado showed that day care and elementary age children who were ex-
empted for religious or philosophical reasons were sixty-two times
more likely to become infected with measles.3 6 The cluster effect
therefore heightens the threats to public health and to the health of
both vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals living in proximity to
groups of exemptors.
Courts have used public health concerns to justify compelling vac-
cinations and withholding religious exemptions. In Jacobson v. Massa-
chusetts, the Court upheld the right of states and local boards of
health to compel vaccinations (in this case, small pox vaccinations in
an area of Massachusetts where smallpox was "prevalent and increas-
ing") using a "self-defense" argument: "Upon the principle of self-
defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to pro-
tect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of
its members.", 37  In Wright v. DeWitt School Distict,3 8 the Supreme
Court of Arkansas held that a compulsory vaccination law with no re-
ligious exemption is constitutional because the right of free exercise
133 On Vashon Island, "nearly one in five schoolchildren opted out of immunizations in the
year 2000, as some residents prefer alternative therapies and homeopathy to vaccines. Unfor-
tunately, outbreaks of whooping cough ... struck the island every year between 1995 and 1999,
hospitalizing some babies and leaving other children with chronic asthma." Steve P. Calan-
drillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their Chil-
dren?, 37 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 353, 356 (2004) (citing Donald G. McNeil Jr., When Parents Say
No to Child Vaccinations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at Al).
14 See May & Silverman, supra note 128, at 1048.
135 Silverman, supra note 3, at 285; see also DV. Rodgers et al., High Attack Rates and Case Fatal-
ity During a Measles Outbreak in Groups with Religious Exemption to Vaccination, 12 PEDIATRIC
INFECTIOUS DISEASEJ. 268, 268 (1993) (addressing a large measles outbreak among members of
two unvaccinated Philadelphia, Pennsylvania church groups infecting almost all children
younger than fourteen);J.E. van Steenbergen, Measles Outbreak-Netherlands, April 1999-January
2000, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALrY WKLY. REP. 299, 300-01 (2000) (discussing the effects of ex-
emptions in the Netherlands); Lee Siegel, Whooping Cough Spreads Through Utah; 30 of the Hun-
dreds Exposed Are Polygamous Family Members, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 12, 1998, at BI (describing
the rapid spread of whooping cough throughout non-immunized communities).
136 Feikin et al., supra note 60, at 3149 (assessing various immunization studies comparing
vaccinated and unvaccinated school-age children), cited in Merrick, supra note 109, at 275.
137 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
im 385 S.W.2d 644 (Ark. 1965).
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is subject to reasonable regulation for the good of the community as
a whole.
3 9
2. The Impracticality of Regulation and Proper Enforcement
Even if religious exemptions were constitutional, states should
consider eliminating the exemptions because they are difficult to en-
force. It is hard to establish and apply a proper test for who might
qualify for the exemption. The court evaluation required for both
the "organized" religion exemption and the sincerity exemption pre-
sent constitutional challenges to the Establishment Clause, as dis-
cussed above.' 40 In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Barber,14 ' the Second Circuit described the difficulty of attempting to
discern the sincerity of an individual's religious beliefs:
Sincerity analysis seeks to determine the subjective good faith of an ad-
herent in performing certain rituals. The goal, of course, is to protect
only those beliefs which are held as a matter of conscience. Human na-
ture being what it is, however, it is frequently difficult to separate this in-
qui 7 from a forbidden one involving the verity of the underlying be-
lief.
Additionally, the religious exemption form system used by many
states is prone to abuse; there is little oversight regarding who is
claiming these exemptions, and therefore "anyone who wants it, gets
it."143 As Ross D. Silverman points out, heavy abuse of the current sys-
tem is common, and "the lack of statutory authority, in at least twenty-
three states, to challenge claims based on religious beliefs, or the re-
laxed enforcement of existing rules, allows virtually any applicant in
such states to gain exemption."' 44 The growth of the Internet has
aided this abuse; several websites contain sample form letters that in-
dividuals may download, sign, and submit to elementary schools to
ask for an exemption. 145 The Internet has also provided an outlet for
several of the radical groups that oppose compelled vaccination to
spread misinformation about vaccinations, promoting individuals to
19 Id. at 648.
140 See discussion supra Part IIA. 1 (First Amendment Concerns: The Establishment Clause).
141 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1981).
142 Id. at 441 (citations omitted).
'43 Donald G. McNeil Jr., Worship Optional. Joining a Church to Avoid Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
14, 2003, at F1 (quoting Daniel A. Salmon of theJohns Hopkins School of Public Health).
144 Silverman, supra note 3, at 285.
145 See Concerned Parents for Vaccine Safety, Here Are Two Examples of a Religious Exemption
Letter (providing examples of two form letters, one extensively quoting from the Bible, that pro-
vide "great ideas on how to write your own religious exemption."), at http://web.archive.org/
web/20040214002204/home.sprynet.com/-gyrene/example.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
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seek exemption any way they can,4 6 which often involves improperly
claiming religious exemption. 4 1 In all of these ways, the Internet has
become an instrument to further exemption abuse.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
There are many possible approaches towards resolving the various
exemption problems discussed above. Below, I discuss several solu-
tions and their practicality.
A. Mandatory Vaccination with No Exemption
One solution, perhaps the most extreme of all proposed solutions,
is to encourage states to abolish the exemptions completely or to nar-
row them further. Interest groups148 and influential scholars who op-
pose the exemptions can lobby state legislatures to abolish the ex-
emptions for public health and public policy concerns. These groups
can also lobby Congress, which has the power to withhold govern-
ment funding from states that do not adopt certain policies. This
strategy would be similar to methods that have been employed to en-
courage states to adopt certain child abuse laws and child welfare
149programs.
1 Recent publicity about the ineffectiveness or dangers associated with vaccinations is often
blown out of proportion. See, e.g., Associated Press, Study: Cervical Cancer Vaccine May Wane Dur-
ing Ovulation, Aug. 5, 2003 ("New research suggests an experimental vaccine against cervical
cancer might lose some of its effectiveness when a woman ovulates."), available at http://
www.thebody.com/cdc/newsupdatesarchive/2003/aug8_03/cancervaccine.html.
147 See infra Part IV (More Practical Solutions) for further discussion of the spread of misin-
formation and the means various organizations are using to counter this erroneous informa-
tion.
148 See, e.g., Jeopardizing Children's Lives, supra note 80 (advocating the repeal of religious ex-
emption laws).
149 See Richard A. Gardner, Revising the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act: Our Best Hope
for Dealing with Sex-Abuse Hysteria in the United States, 5 INST. FOR PSYCHOL. THERAPIESJ. (1993)
(stating that, in order for states to qualify for federal monies, they had to "provid[e] immunity
from prosecution for all those reporting child abuse and required specific persons (such as
health-care professionals, law-enforcement officials, teachers, and school administrators) to re-
port suspected child abuse to the appropriate child protection agency"), available at http://
www.ipt-forensics.com/joumal/volume5/j5 -_3.htm. As one source explains,
In the early 1970's, hearings were held in Congress regarding the long ignored issue
of child abuse. Subsequent to these hearings, Congress enacted the Child Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment Act (CAPTA) ... which provided federal funding to states with
which to engage in child protection investigation, intervention, and criminal prosecu-
tions. In order to receive this matching and additional federal funding, states had to
come into compliance with the federal law, by enacting matching laws that provided for
anonymous reporting, mandated reporting, immunity to reporting parties, and addi-
tional grants for the "successful prosecution" of child abusers.
Menstuff, False Accusations of Child Abuse, at http://www.menstuff.org/issues/byissue/
falseaccusation.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2005).
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Public health advocates can also bring a constitutional challenge
to the religious exemption, arguing that the religious exemption
statutes improperly advance religion and violate the Establishment
Clause. For the reasons discussed in Part II.A.1 above, the Supreme
Court should follow the district court's ruling in Sherr v. Northport-East
Northport Union Free School District 5° and declare exemption statutes
unconstitutional because they violate the second and third prongs of
the Lemon v. Kurtzman'5' test. The court demonstrated that, under
the Constitution, "certain religious denominations cannot be granted
privileges not afforded to other denominations or religions"152 and
that the "restriction of [an] exception to 'recognized religious or-
ganizations' clearly requires that the government involve itself in reli-
gious matters to an inordinate degree."53 It is not likely that such an
approach would be effective, however, because the Supreme Court
has previously denied certiorari to cases dealing with the constitu-
tionality of the exemption system. 5 4 This approach will hopefully
proliferate to more state courts and modify state law in areas that al-
low exemptions.
B. Fundamental Changes for a Workable System
Another unlikely but efficient approach could involve a paradigm
shift in the construction of exemption statutes. Ideally, a state legisla-
ture would draft an exemption that would both preserve the religious
freedoms guaranteed under the Free Exercise Clause and avoid the
Establishment Clause violation presented by the current religious ex-
emption statutes. The ideal exemption would be easier to qualify for
than the "organized" religion and sincerity analysis exemptions, yet it
would impose a higher threshold than the form exemption (whereby
the applicant needs to only fill out a form to qualify for an exemp-
tion) to avoid the problems of abuse and overuse in the current sys-
tem. Until a state legislature proposes this ideal exemption statute,
however, states must review their current statutes to respond to ongo-
ing or potential constitutional challenges. Additionally, this "ideal"
exemption remains, for now, simply an ideal. Therefore the more
practical solutions discussed below are more likely to serve as feasible
solutions to the problems surrounding the current vaccination sys-
tem.
150 672 F. Supp. 81, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The clause of § 2164(9) at issue in this litigation
runs afoul of at least two of the three elements of the Lemon test.").
151 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
152 Jeopardizing Children's Lives, supra note 80.
153 Sherr, 672 F. Supp. at 90.
154 See, e.g., Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 224 (Miss. 1979) (declaring Mississippi's religious
exemption statute unconstitutional), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980).
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Another solution might involve creating or promoting a com-
monly accepted community practice of requiring immunizations
when there are reported outbreaks of particular diseases in a nearby
region. Under this system, in states with religious or philosophical
exemptions, a parent can still choose not to immunize her child;
however, the parent can be forced to obtain specific immunizations if
the school can demonstrate an actual danger. One significant short-
coming of such a system, however, is the threat of creating a slippery
slope; such a system would sound ideal to the "borderline" parent
who would otherwise vaccinate her child but chooses not to knowing
that the child can simply be vaccinated at a later time should nearby
incidences of disease arise. The parent might therefore be more
likely to opt out of vaccination.
Additionally, the entire purpose of vaccination is to promote pub-
lic health and preventative medicine; if too many people take advan-
tage of such an exemption, these values are undermined. If prac-
ticed in large numbers, this system can pose a serious threat to public
health because as more exemptions are granted in an area, the bene-
fits of herd immunity decrease and the threats of the cluster problem
and a potential outbreak increase in that area.
C. The More Practical Solutions
Perhaps the most practical way to help curb exemption abuse is to
correct any misinformation about vaccinations so that fewer individu-
als will improperly seek exemption for this reason. Public informa-
tional campaigns can be used to this end. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention's ("CDC") National Immunization Program
has already identified and refuted several common misconceptions
regarding vaccination, 55 including the ideas that disease reduction is
not due to vaccination but rather to improvements in hygiene and
sanitation; that most people who become sick with diseases are vacci-
nated; that vaccines regularly cause harmful side effects and illnesses;
and that vaccinations are no longer necessary in the United States
because of the elimination of diseases.56 In addition, Paul Offit and
Louis Bell address several popular and false vaccination myths, 57 in-
cluding the ideas that infants are too young to be immunized, that
current vaccines weaken the immune system, that vaccines contain
155 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 6
COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT VACCINATION AND HOW TO RESPOND TO THEM (1996) (ad-
dressing some common misunderstandings about vaccination), at http://www.cdc.gov/nip/
publications/6mishome.htm.
15 See Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 886 (listing these ideas as common misperceptions).
157 See PAUL A. OFFIT & Louis M. BELL, VACCINES: WHAT EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNOW 107-
20 (1999) (reviewing and dispelling several prominent myths regarding child vaccinations).
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preservatives and other infectious agents that may harm individuals,18
and that pharmaceutical companies manufacture batches of vaccine
that cause high rates of adverse events.' 9
Researchers have also conducted studies to address new theories
and popular beliefs that arise about the dangers of particular vaccina-
tions; these studies should be publicized more heavily, and research-
ers should further expand this research. Since autism often appears
in the second year of life, around the same time children receive cer-
tain vaccines, many people have speculated that the certain vaccines,
specifically the measles, mumps and rubella ("MMR") vaccine, might
cause autism.'6 ° Studies conducted in the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Denmark all found that children with autism were not
more likely than other children to have received the MMR vaccine, or
to have received the MMR vaccine recently.1
6
Congress became involved in the effort to impart correct informa-
tion regarding vaccinations to the public. In 1986, Congress enacted
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act ("NCVIA")'0 to help dis-
seminate more information about vaccinations and to address the in-
creasing number of liability cases for injuries resulting from the use
of vaccines. The NCVIA established four programs: The National
Vaccine Program, 16 the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 164 the
158 This idea has been popularized by recent arguments that the polio vaccination may have
spread HIV. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, New Book Challenges Theories of AIDS Origins, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at F1 (reviewing and discussing EDWARD HOOPER, THE RIVER: AJOURNEY
TO THE SOURCE OF HIV AND AIDS (1999)); Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 887 (referring to
Altman book review).
159 This high rate of adverse events is also called "hot lots." OFFIT & BELL, supra note 157, at
107-20; see also Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 886 (noting that the CDC includes the idea of
harmful vaccines among the list of misconceptions it is seeking to debunk).
160 See Tex. Med. Ass'n, supra note 100 (addressing the concerns of Texans regarding the
safety of vaccinations).
See KM. Madsen et al., A Population-based Study of Measles, Mumps, and Rubella Vaccination
and Autism, 347 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1477, 1480 (2002) ("This study provides three strong argu-
ments against a causal relationship between MMR vaccination and autism."); see also Tex. Med.
Ass'n, supra note 100 ("All of these studies found that children with autism were not more likely
to have received the MMR vaccine.").
162 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Star. 3756 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34 (2000)); see also Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at
885 ("[T]he [NCVIA] compensates persons who suffer from certain vaccine-induced inju-
ries .... ."); Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program, 24J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 59 (1999) (describing the impact of the
NCVIA).
163 This program in the Department of Health and Human Services is "responsible for most
aspects of vaccination policy--e.g., research, development, safety and efficacy testing, licensing,
distribution, and use... ." Hodge & Gostin, supra note 1, at 885.
164 This program
compensates persons who suffer from certain vaccine-induced injuries according to val-
ues set in a Vaccine Injury Table. Though well-intended, this program has been highly
controversial. While it has sharply reduced litigation, the "no-fault" adjudication system
[Vol. 7:4
STATE-COMPELLED VACCINATION
Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System, and a vaccine informa-
tion system.1
6 s
All of these efforts can be further expanded and targeted to reach
audiences living in specific geographic regions, including areas with
higher percentages of exemptors, and states that allow for both phi-
losophical and religious exemptions. Interest groups can also raise
funds to finance public health campaigns that promote child vaccina-
tion generally and portray vaccines in a positive light and seek to cor-
rect the common misconceptions surrounding vaccination.
CONCLUSION
In light of the constitutional problems, threats to public health
and the rights of unvaccinated children, and the difficulty in prevent-
ing the overuse and abuse of exemptions, the current exemption sys-
tem is in need of review and reform, if not complete abolition. While
informational campaigns and lobbying efforts can help decrease the
widespread abuse of the exemptions, the exemptions are in need of
fundamental changes to survive constitutional muster. Only then
might an exemption system exist that can reconcile the competing
interests of those concerned with upholding the Establishment
Clause with those who strongly advocate for the Free Exercise Clause.
has been time consuming, costly, and adversarial. Nearly three-fourths of claims have
been dismissed.
Id.
1 This reporting system "requires health care providers and manufacturers to report certain
adverse events from vaccines." Id.
1 This information system "requires all health care providers to give parents standardized
written information before administering certain vaccines." Id.
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